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ABSTRACT 
 The Board of Veterans Appeals exists to decide questions of whether U.S. 
military veterans were improperly denied benefits from Department of Vet-
erans Affairs Regional Offices around the country. The Board hears thou-
sands of cases each year, where veterans are given the option to present 
new evidence and arguments in support of their claims at non-adversarial 
hearings before the Board Member tasked with reviewing their claim. In 
Cook v. Snyder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determined 
a veteran was not precluded from seeking a subsequent hearing before the 
Board at a new stage of the adjudication process. This Article analyzes the 
holding in Cook to find it may be interpreted broadly or narrowly in future 
cases and concludes that absent further guidance from the Secretary of Vet-
erans Affairs, claimants are left with an ambiguous standard for whether 
they are entitled to more than one hearing during the appeals process. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”), which makes final appellate 
determinations within the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability 
benefits claims system, rendered 55,713 decisions during fiscal year 2015, 
the last year for which data is available.1 The Board conducted hearings, 
where the veteran was afforded the opportunity to offer testimony in sup-
port of his or her claim directly to the member of the Board tasked with de-
ciding it, in 12,738 of those decisions.2 In 1988, when proposing the statu-
tory right to a hearing now codified by 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b), the Senate 
Veterans’ Affairs Committee observed there was a correlation between 
hearings before the Board and successful claims.3   
In Cook v. Snyder, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (“Court”) addressed the meaning 38 U.S.C § 7107(b). The statute 
reads: “The Board shall decide any appeal only after affording the appellant 
an opportunity for a hearing.”4 The question the Court addressed was 																																																													
1 Bd. of Veteran’s Appeals, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 5 (2016), http://www.bva.va.gov/docs 
/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2015AR.pdf. 
2 563 hearings took place at the Board, 4,566 took place at regional offices when members of the Board 
traveled there for the purposes of conducting hearings, and 7,609 took place by video conference where 
the veteran communicated from their local regional office with a member of the Board in Washington, 
D.C. See id. at 28. 
3 Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 336-337 (2017) (noting that in fiscal year 1987, 19.5% of claims 
heard by a Board member in Washington, D.C. were granted and 30.6% of claims heard by Board mem-
bers at travel hearings were granted, compared to an overall grant rate of 12.8%.). 
4 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b) (2017). 
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whether the phrase “an opportunity for a hearing” was properly read in the 
singular, i.e. whether entitlement to one hearing is all the VA must provide 
before rendering a decision on a veteran’s claim for disability benefits, or if 
that veteran is entitled to additional hearings upon request during different 
stages of the proceedings.   
Each claim for VA disability benefits begins with the veteran filing a 
claim with their local VA Regional Office (“RO”). When the RO makes a 
decision, they will also notify the claimant of the right to initiate the appeals 
process.5 In order to begin the appeal, the veteran must submit a “notice of 
disagreement” within one year of an unfavorable decision.6 If the RO con-
tinues to deny the claim, the veteran can appeal the denial to the Board.7 
When appealing to the Board, the veteran may indicate whether he or she 
wishes to be afforded a hearing before the Board renders a decision on their 
claim.8 
The hearings are intended to be informal and non-adversarial, and are in-
tended to give the veteran an opportunity to provide any information they 
feel is relevant and material to their claim. The Board member conducting 
the hearing has the duty to “explain fully the issues and suggest the submis-
sion of evidence which the claimant may have overlooked and which would 
be of advantage to the claimant’s position.”9 A transcript of the hearing will 
be produced and added to the veteran’s claims file for consideration before 
the Board renders a decision.10 If the Board renders a negative decision and 
the veteran remains unsatisfied, he or she may then file an appeal with the 
Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of Board decisions and 
has the power to reverse, remand or affirm the Board’s decision.11 
In Cook, the Court addressed the interpretation of the phrase “an oppor-
tunity for a hearing,” specific to a situation where the veteran sought an ad-
ditional hearing following an earlier remand of his claim from the Court. 
The Court addressed whether this phrase meant that the veteran was pre-
cluded from a second hearing at a separate stage of his appeal, after initially 
being provided one as part of his initial appeal to the Board. The Court’s 
holding, that Mr. Cook was not precluded from a second hearing, applies 
much more broadly to a veteran’s right to present sworn testimony in the 																																																													
5 38 C.F.R. 38 § 19.25 (2017). 
6 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1) (2017). 
7 38 C.F.R. § 19.25 (2017). 
8 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(e) (2016). 
9 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2016). 
10 38 C.F.R. § 20.714 (2016). 
11 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-52, 7266 (2016). 
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process of VA adjudication of his or her claim, but still leaves certain ques-
tions unanswered. It also offers important guidance on the question of what 
deference is owed to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs in his interpretation 
and application of VA’s regulations. 
I. BACKGROUND OF MR. COOK’S CASE 
 Edward Cook (“the Veteran”) served in the United States Navy in 
1972 and 1973.12 His service medical records indicated that he experienced 
low back pain while in service and at one point was diagnosed with a mild 
muscle pull.13 Mr. Cook filed a claim for service connection at his local RO 
in May 2000, asserting that his current back disability was caused by or re-
lated to the back injury suffered during his time in service.14 His claim was 
denied, and in 2006 he sought to reopen it. In 2007, the RO denied his re-
quest because it determined the evidence submitted was not new and mate-
rial and therefore did not justify reopening the previously denied claim.15   
 Mr. Cook appealed the denial to the Board.16 Separately, Mr. Cook 
filed a new claim with the RO seeking entitlement to total disability based 
on individual unemployability (“TDIU”), which was also denied by the RO 
and which he also appealed to the Board.17   
 In June 2012, Mr. Cook testified at a Board hearing. Following his 
testimony about his back problems and their effects on employment, the 
Board found that new and material evidence had been submitted, which 
warranted reopening his claim, and remanded the claim to the RO for fur-
ther evidentiary development.18 After the RO received additional evidence 
and Mr. Cook underwent a VA examination, it continued to deny his claim 
																																																													
12 Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 333 (2017) 
13 Id. 
14  Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2016). 
15  Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2016) (“A claimant may reopen a finally ad-
judicated claim by submitting new and material evidence. New evidence means existing evidence not 
previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by 
itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to 
substantiate the claim.”). 
16  Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333. 
17  Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2016) (“Total disability ratings for compensation may be assigned, 
where the schedular rating is less than total, when the disabled person is, in the judgment of the rating 
agency, unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected 
disabilities”). 
18 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333. 
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for service connection and entitlement to TDIU.19 Mr. Cook then requested 
a new Board hearing to provide further testimony.20 
 The Board issued a new decision in February 2014 that continued to 
deny the Veteran’s claims.21 It acknowledged Mr. Cook’s request for a 
hearing, but denied it, stating that because he had already been afforded a 
Board hearing, no further hearing was necessary.22 Mr. Cook appealed this 
denial to the Court.23 In October 2014, the Court granted a joint motion for 
remand filed by the parties and sent the appeal back to the Board on the 
grounds that it failed to address favorable evidence in its previous deci-
sion.24 Following this, Mr. Cook again requested a Board hearing to present 
additional testimony in support of his claim.25  
 Mr. Cook was not afforded an additional hearing, and the Board ren-
dered a new decision denying his claim in February 2015.26 In its decision, 
the Board specifically noted that because the Veteran had previously been 
afforded a hearing before the Board in June 2012, no further hearing was 
necessary.27 The Veteran again appealed this denial, which lead to the 
Court’s precedential decision.28   
II. DISCUSSION OF THE COURT’S HOLDING 
 The parties set forth two very differing arguments on the narrow 
question of whether the Board properly determined that Mr. Cook was not 
entitled to an additional hearing. Mr. Cook argued that the indefinite article 
“a” in § 20.700(a) did not limit a claimant to one hearing, regardless of the 
number of times the claim was before the Board.29 The Secretary of Veter-
ans Affairs, on the other hand, argued that “a” usually connotes the singu-
lar; that his interpretation of the regulatory language is entitled to deference 																																																													
19 Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1). 
20 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 334. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.   
24 Id. 
25 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 334. 
26 Id.   
27 Id.   
28 Id.; see generally Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 23, 25-26 (1990) (demonstrating that the majority 
of the decisions the Court issues are Single Judge Decisions binding only on the parties that may not be 
cited as precedent.). 
29 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 335; 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(a)(2016)(“A hearing on appeal will be granted if an 
appellant, or an appellant's representative acting on his or her behalf, expresses a desire to appear in per-
son.”.). 
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to the extent the language could be considered ambiguous; and that Mr. 
Cook’s interpretation of the regulation would lead to “absurd results.”30   
As with any question of statutory interpretation, the Court applied the 
test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.31 It determined that “both parties advanced grammatically plausible 
readings of the sentence, ‘the Board shall decide any appeal only after af-
fording the appellant an opportunity for a hearing,’” and reached the con-
clusion that “the statute’s language is simply not clear on this point.”32 
Thus, it determined that 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b) was ambiguous with respect to 
the question of whether a veteran may be afforded more than one hearing.33 
Further, it found that the regulation identified by the Secretary which im-
plemented the statutory provision, 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(a), did not speak to 
the ambiguity at issue because it contained the same basic ambiguous lan-
guage as the statute.34 As such, the Court declined to apply Chevron defer-
ence to the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation.35 Concluding that 
Chevron deference was inapplicable, the Court then turned to the test set 
forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and concluded that the Secretary’s inter-
pretation of the language at issue lacked the power to persuade.36  
After establishing that Skidmore, rather than Chevron applied, the Court 
sought to ascertain the meaning of the statute by reading the statute as a 
whole.  Upon determining that doing so did not eliminate the ambiguity, the 
Court looked to the statute’s context with a view to its place in the statutory 
scheme.37 The Court noted that a crux of the Veterans Judicial Review Act 
(“VJRA”), which established judicial review of VA’s administrative deci-
sions, was that the Court could set aside Board decisions and remand ap-
peals, more than once if necessary.38 The Court noted, “the focus of a claim 																																																													
30 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 335. 
31 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984). 
32 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338. 
33 Id. at 339. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 339-340; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944). 
(“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
37 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338. 
38 Pub.L. 100–687, (The Veteran’s Judicial Review Act of 1988 established the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims); Id. at 339, (The passage of the act “ended the “splendid isolation” in 
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may change or evolve between an initial Board hearing on the claim and 
Board consideration of that claim following remand from the Court,” a 
principle which proved key to its ultimate holding.39 The Court determined 
that reading the statute as barring a claimant who had previously testified 
from receiving a subsequent hearing during further appellate proceedings 
would be “neither solicitous of a claimant nor productive of informed Board 
decision making.”40   
Against this backdrop, the Court turned to the facts of Mr. Cook’s ap-
peal. Specifically, when Mr. Cook testified before the Board in June 2012, 
the Court noted that the issue was whether new and material evidence had 
been submitted to reopen the previously denied claim for service connec-
tion for a lumbar spine disability.41 After the Board agreed to reopen the 
claim, but denied it again, the issue on appeal had shifted.42 By the time the 
Veteran requested a subsequent Board hearing in November 2014, the issue 
was no longer whether he had provided new and material evidence suffi-
cient to reopen the previously denied claim.43 Rather, the issue was now 
whether or not the evidence of record demonstrated that the Veteran’s cur-
rent back problems were linked to his service.44 At the time Mr. Cook re-
quested his second hearing, he asserted that he had relevant evidence in 
support of that issue.45 As the Court noted, to read the statute as prohibiting 
him from testifying at a Board hearing where the issue had changed “from 
one issue with distinct legal criteria to another” would be inconsistent with 
the principles underlying the pro-claimant veterans’ disability appeals proc-
ess.46   
In concluding that the Board erred by finding Mr. Cook was not entitled 
to an additional hearing, the Court was careful to include language in its 
holding stating that it was not adopting the argument that he is entitled to a 
Board hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason.”47 Instead, it con-
fined its holding to stating simply that a claimant who received a hearing at 
one stage of appellate proceedings is not barred from requesting and receiv-																																																																																																																																													
which VA’s administrative decisions, unlike those of other Federal agencies, were “insulated from judi-
cial review.”). 
39 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 342. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 343. 
43 Id. at 342-343. 
44 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 342-343. 
45 Id. at 343. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 345. 
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ing a Board hearing during a separate stage.48 It further indicated that it was 
sensitive to the “administrative burden facing the Board in the provision of 
personal hearings on matters appealed to it.”49 However, despite such con-
cerns, the Court determined that deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation 
of the statute would be ignoring the intent of Congress discerned from the 
language of the statute, “the text and context of related statutory and regula-
tory provisions, and the overall structure of the VJRA, and the solicitous 
and pro-claimant principles informing veterans’ benefits law.”50 It further 
noted that the Secretary was free to follow public notice and comment 
guidelines and promulgate a regulation that resolves the ambiguity in the 
statute.51 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s holding in Cook is significant in both the clarity it provides 
to the question of a how expansive a veteran’s right to a hearing during the 
VA claim’s process is, its use of language clarifying that the right does not 
extend to entitlement to a hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason,” 
and for the questions it leaves unanswered. It is also notable for its detailed 
demonstration of the process of interpreting an ambiguous VA regulation 
and how such process is unique to the veterans’ disability benefits statutory 
and regulatory scheme.   
As the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims exists exclusively to pro-
vide judicial oversight of VA actions, the Court must always apply the 
framework set forth in Chevron in interpreting the meaning of any statute.52 
If the Court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, it then turns to the agency’s implementing regulation and 
must determine whether such regulation is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. If so, the Court must apply the framework set forth in 
Chevron in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute which it ad-
ministers.53 As the implementing regulation in this case contained the same 
ambiguous language as the statute, the Court determined that Chevron def-
erence was not appropriate.54 Turning to the guidelines espoused in Skid-
																																																													
48 Id. 
49 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 340. 
50 Id. at 345. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 345-346. 
53 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
54 See id. 
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more, the Court then addressed whether the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
statute contained the “power to persuade,” and concluded that it did not.55 
From there, the Court sought guidance in the statute’s context “with a 
view to its place in the statutory scheme.”56 In doing so, the Court turned its 
focus to interpretative guidance that is unique to veterans’ benefits jurispru-
dence and which ultimately guided its decision in Cook. The Court noted 
the Supreme Court’s observation that the VA adjudicatory process is de-
signed to function “with a high degree of informality and solicitude for the 
claimant.”57 Furthermore, as the Court described, the VA adjudicatory 
process is a non-adversarial system that is predicated upon a structure that 
provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard throughout every step of 
the process.58 Even if the Secretary’s interpretation of a statute is “plausi-
ble,” the Court will adopt the Secretary’s interpretation that is less favorable 
to the veteran only if the statutory language unambiguously requires it to do 
so.59 
The Court held in Trafter v. Shinseki, noting the specificity to the veter-
ans’ benefits scheme: 
[If] VA’s interpretation of the statutes is reasonable, the courts are precluded 
from substituting their judgment for that of VA, unless the Secretary has ex-
ceeded his authority; the Secretary’s action was clearly wrong; or the Secre-
tary’s interpretation is unfavorable to veterans, such that it conflicts with the 
beneficence underpinning VA’s veterans benefits scheme, and a more liberal 
construction is available that affords a harmonious interplay between provi-
sions.60   
Put simply, the Court has the ability to “substitute” its judgment for the 
Secretary’s only in instances where the Secretary’s interpretation conflicts 
with the intended beneficence of the veterans’ benefits scheme.  
The Court drew on this ability in Cook to conclude that a veteran who re-
ceived a hearing at one stage of the proceedings is not barred from receiv-
ing another hearing during a separate stage. The “high degree of informality 
and solicitude for the claimant,” along with the predication of the VA adju-
dicatory process on the opportunity to be heard throughout the progression 																																																													
55 Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 338-339 (2017). 
56 Id. at 340. 
57 Id. at 341(citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S.428, 431 (2011)). 
58 Id. 
59Id. (citing Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
60 Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267, 272 (2013). (referencing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 
(1994), which also noted that the length of endurance of certain regulations has no bearing on whether it 
is consistent with a statute, which is particularly true in veterans’ law given that Congress took so long 
to provide for judicial review of VA actions). 
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of the claim, prompted the Court to determine that reading the statute as a 
bar to a subsequent Board hearings at a later stage of the proceedings would 
be inconsistent with the stated purpose of a Board hearing in the context of 
the judicial review process of VA decision making.61 Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Circuit’s guidance, that even a plausible interpretation from the Secre-
tary that is less favorable to the veteran only warrants deference when the 
language unambiguously requires that interpretation, freed the Court from 
being bound by the Secretary’s interpretation in the present case, even if 
such interpretation was plausible.62 
Although the Court declined to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of 
the statute and remanded Mr. Cook’s case to the Board so he could be af-
forded the additional hearing that he sought, the Court was careful to ex-
plain the limits of its holding.63 It clarified that the language of the statute 
did not entitle the veteran to “a Board hearing at any time on any issue for 
any reason.”64 Instead, it limited its holding to a situation such as Mr. 
Cook’s, where the veteran was seeking a second hearing at a separate stage 
of the appellate proceedings before the Board, namely after the appeal had 
already been sent back to the Board by way of a remand order from the 
Court.65   
The Court expressed the limits of its holding in the statement that the 
claimant is “not barred” from requesting and receiving a second Board 
hearing at a separate stage of the proceedings, but did not go as far as to 
state that a claimant is “entitled” to an additional hearing simply because a 
claim is back in front of the Board following an additional step in the pro-
ceedings.66 Clearly, the onus remains on the veteran and his or her repre-
sentative to evaluate the status of the evidentiary development in their claim 
and make the determination of whether seeking an additional hearing before 
the Board will be worthwhile. The Court acknowledged this near the end of 
its decision, and recognized that claimants may opt to forgo opportunities 
for Board hearings in the interest of obtaining quicker decisions from the 
Board.67  
It is clear from the Court’s holding that veterans have the right to seek an 
additional hearing in a situation such as Mr. Cook’s, where the claim is 																																																													
61 Henderson ex. rel. v. Shinseki, 562, U.S. 428, 431 (2011). 
62 Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 345 (2017). 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 346. 
66 Id. at 345. 
67 Id. 
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back before the Board following an earlier remand from the Court. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear whether that is a blanket right that applies to 
other situations where a claim is back before the Board after a separate 
stage in the appellate process. For example, a veteran may appeal a regional 
office denial to the Board and request a Board hearing.68 The testimony put 
forth during that hearing may prompt the Board to send the veteran’s claim 
back to the RO for additional evidentiary development, such as locating 
missing treatment records or obtaining a needed VA examination.69 Al-
though the veteran may choose to waive regional office consideration and 
send the case directly back to the Board for a new decision, he or she may 
also opt to have the RO consider the additional evidence and render a new 
decision based thereon.70 If the RO does so, and continues to render an un-
favorable decision, could the veteran then request an additional hearing be-
fore the Board renders a new decision on his or her claim? 
In such an instance, the issue the Board would be considering, such as, 
for example, service connection for a back disability, would likely be un-
changed from the previous hearing. The Board would be considering new 
evidence, but the issue itself would remain the same. The Court pointed out 
in Cook that the issue on appeal had shifted from the time of Mr. Cook’s 
first hearing to the time that he requested his second.71 While the Court 
stated that reading the statute as prohibiting the claimant from testifying at a 
Board hearing “where the issue on appeal had shifted” was counter to the 
stated purpose of a hearing and inconsistent with the pro-claimant VA ap-
peals system,72 it is unclear if the Court’s interpretation would apply to an 
instance where the issue on appeal had not “shifted.” From the Court’s later 
statement, that a veteran is “not barred” from requesting and receiving a 
hearing at a separate stage of the appeal, it appears this right would likely 
remain following a remand from the Court, even if the issue on appeal re-
mained the same. It is not certain, however, that the right would apply to the 
hypothetical situation described above, where a veteran’s claim is back in 
front of the Board following additional development at the RO level.   
Answering this question would require the Court to explain how it de-
fines a “stage” of the appeal, and how broadly or narrowly it would define 
what constitutes a “separate issue.” Taking the hypothetical situation of the 
veteran whose claim for service connection for a back disability is re-																																																													
68 See 38 C.F.R. § 20.200 (1992); 38 C.F.R. § 20.700 (1992). 
69 See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1506 (2008); 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1992). 
70 38 C.F.R. § 20.1508 (2008). 
71 Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 342-343 (2017). 
72 Id. at 343. 
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manded from the Board to the RO then winds up back before the Board, 
would this be considered a separate “stage” of the appeal, or is it a con-
tinuation of the earlier stage? Furthermore, if the veteran sought a separate 
hearing so that he could offer testimony on the inability to locate certain 
evidence, or to challenge the adequacy or factual conclusions of a VA ex-
amination, could that be considered a “separate issue,” if his or her first 
Board hearing focused entirely on a description of the in-service injury and 
current symptoms? Or would requesting a hearing on such issues be akin to 
seeking a hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason,” which the 
Court expressly rejected in Cook?73 Does the Board maintain any discretion 
in making such a determination? 
It is likely that such questions cannot be answered solely from the 
Court’s interpretation of section 7107(b) and its holding in Cook. What is 
clear from Cook is that when a veteran who has previously testified before 
the Board seeks a new hearing at a subsequent stage of the appeal, particu-
larly following a remand order from the Court, he is not barred from receiv-
ing a new hearing by the statute’s use of the phrase “an opportunity for a 
hearing.”74 Whether or not the Board must unequivocally grant such a re-
quest, or whether such a request made at a different stage of the appeals 
process must be afforded the same consideration, likely remains uncertain. 
Following Cook, it appears that at the very least the Board must provide le-
gally sound reasons and bases if it denies a request for a subsequent Board 
hearing, regardless of when that request is made.75 If the Board denies such 
a request, but articulates that it is doing so because the “stage” of the appeal 
has not changed and/or the issue on appeal remains the same, Cook does not 
go so far as to hold that the Board’s decision will automatically be re-
manded for that reason alone if and when it is appealed to the Court. 
As the Court suggested, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may wish to 
promulgate a new regulation resolving the ambiguity in the statute and pro-
viding clarity on the issue.76  However, it is clear from the Court’s reason-
ing in Cook that veterans and their representatives will want to take a close 
look at whether an additional hearing may be worthwhile or necessary in 
putting forth the strongest case possible, particularly following a previous 
remand order from the Court, even if the issue on appeal remains un-
changed. This must be weighed against the additional time it may take for 																																																													
73 Id. at 345. 
74 Id. at 341. 
75 See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d) (“Each decision of the Board shall include--a written statement of the 
Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those findings and conclusions, on all 
material issues of fact and law presented on the record[.]”). 
76 Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 345-346. 
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the veteran to receive a final decision on his or her claim. It is clear that the 
Board can no longer ignore or deny such a request simply on the basis that 
the veteran was previously afforded a hearing, as the Board decision on ap-
peal in Cook did.77 Whether the Board maintains the discretion to deny such 
a request, if it articulates adequate reasons or bases for its decision to do so, 
likely must still be addressed on a case by case basis. This is likely to re-
main the case unless and until the Secretary promulgates a new regulation 
aimed at resolving the remaining ambiguity.   
																																																													
77 See id. at 334. (quoting the Board decision: “The [v]eteran was afforded a Board hearing in June 
2012. He also presented testimony before the RO in September 2007. The transcripts have been associ-
ated with the record. As the [v]eteran has been afforded a Board hearing, no further hearing is neces-
sary.”). 
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